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Rational Parties, Radical Voters? 
Fringe Party Recruitment Strategies at the National and European Levels 
 
Scholars and practitioners alike have long noted the relative lack of interest in 
European Parliament (EP) elections, both on the part of the voting public and from 
mainstream national politicians (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley 2009; 
Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984; Schmitt 2005). Within the academic literature, this has 
led to a characterization of EP elections as being ‘second order’ in interest to both 
European voters and political parties, as compared with national political contests. It 
also contributes to portrayals of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as a 
klatch of political amateurs, retirees, or fringe extremists—even as the real legislative 
powers of the EP have greatly expanded since the initiation of direct European elections 
in 1979 (Kreppel 2002). 
Indeed, the analytical narrative remains that the EP is disproportionately 
comprised of fringe elements and extremist parties – happily installed by a select rump 
of the full voting public, that itself is rife with absenteeism during EP elections. The 
recent European elections of May 2014 provide ample support for this thesis, as groups 
like French National Front (FN) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
dominated both campaign coverage and the electoral returns themselves. While these 
one-sided characterizations of MEPs as amateurs and extremists are certainly 
overblown (Daniel 2013; Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009; Navarro 2009a), it 
remains the case that smaller fringe parties do continue to outperform their 
mainstream national rivals during European elections in many ways (i.e., Schmitt 2005).  
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One popular explanation for why fringe parties do so well in EP elections is that 
EP voters are less politically aware or interested in the particular issue areas addressed 
by EU politics and are thus more comfortable in voting with their ‘hearts,’ rather than 
with their ‘minds.’ While scholars have spent some time exploring the impact of second-
order elections on the behavior of voters, comparatively less attention has been given 
to what impact the second-order election hypothesis may have on the behavior of 
political parties responsible for fielding candidates at multiple levels of elected office, as 
well as on the professional ambitions of individual politicians seeking election, 
themselves.   
Accordingly, this paper explores the rational incentive for politicians from 
European political parties that operate outside of the mainstream of national political 
systems to focus their attention disproportionately on EP elections, as compared with 
their more mainstream national analogues. This proposition should thus result in an 
alternative logic of candidate selection and nomination practices for fringe parties, 
which in focusing disproportionately on EP elections will also stack them with 
experienced incumbents that can serve quality candidates, more so than the traditional 
governing parties. This logic would also indicate that fringe parties will also consider EP 
elections to be potentially more important to their long term successes than national 
ones. In other words, whereas the second-order election hypothesis suggests that 
parties and voters alike will treat EP elections as less important than national 
competitions, this paper challenges the assumption for parties outside of the 
mainstream, which may actually treat EP elections as their first-order contests.  
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In the following section, I define what is meant by fringe parties and develop two 
alternative ways of operationalizing this concept. I then use a discussion of the extant 
literature on fringe groups and their relationship to second-order elections to craft a 
theory of candidate selection that assumes that fringe parties will be more likely than 
mainstream ones to promote incumbent in EP elections and will thus focus 
disproportionately on EP elections, as compared with national contests. I then develop 
and test a range of hypotheses related to this theory, using original data collected on all 
individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the two most recently 
completed waves of parliament, 2004-2014. In doing so, I am able to provide empirical 
support to my claim that MEPs from fringe parties will be more likely to select quality 
candidates in EP races, rather than MEPs from mainstream parties—particularly when 
these EP elections are held in ‘off years’ from national contests.  
 
I. First-Order Elections for Second-Order Parties? 
Before testing the assumption that fringe parties may actually treat EP contests 
as first order, as compared with their mainstream counterparts, I must first define what 
exactly is meant by fringe parties, as well as explore how these parties and their 
constituent politicians may have a different set of opportunity structures, as compared 
with mainstream parties, when it comes to selecting candidates for electoral contests. I 
couch this discussion in the extant literature on candidate selection in EP elections, in 
order to present my theory that fringe political parties will treat EP elections with 
greater attention than their mainstream national rivals, in selecting experienced 
candidates for European contests. 
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What is a Fringe Party? 
 Throughout the paper, I refer to ‘fringe’ parties as a general category for those 
political parties that operate outside of the mainstream of national political life. Fringe 
parties have traditionally been smaller than mainstream parties—in terms of their 
representation at the national level—and enter into governing coalitions less frequently 
or not at all. They may or may not have radical or extreme ideological agendas. While 
the bulk of research on fringe parties in Europe has typically centered on radical right-
wing and right-wing populist parties (i.e., Carter 2005; Ignazi 2006; Norris 2005), plenty 
of research also exists on pro-regionalist and separatist parties, single-issue Eurosceptic 
parties, and parties from the far left. For the purposes of this paper, I acknowledge that 
fringe parties of all stripes may espouse very different beliefs and goals, but also face 
similar structural challenges when it comes to accessing elected power.  
 As noted above, fringe parties are typically defined as such, either in relation to 
their size or because of their non-mainstream ideological agendas. For the purposes of 
this paper, I consider both of these factors in turn. First, If parties are to be considered 
as fringe groups because they are ideologically extreme, then we might expect that they 
espouse beliefs that are so incompatible with mainstream governance that it is 
impossible for them to enter into governing coalitions. As represented in the EP, these 
national political parties will likely be found among the far left (GUE/NGL), Eurosceptic 
(EFD), and non-aligned (NI) party groups. Table 1 lists all of the national political parties 
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represented in the EP, 2009-2014, that were members of these three blocs and might 
therefore be considered as fringe parties, due to their ideologically extreme nature.2  
[ Table 1 about here. ] 
Second, parties might be considered to be fringe groups simply because they are 
too small to have a dominating effect on national politics. Norris’ (2005) work on the 
major challenges faced by far-right parties in Europe considers a number of these 
structural hurdles that may also apply to other smaller parties, outside of the far right. 
In addition to the presence or lack of certain social cleavages that may be receptive to 
radical ideologies, fringe parties are often hampered by institutional barriers to entry, 
restrictive electoral systems, as well as intraparty organizational problems. Institutional 
barriers might include difficulties accessing ballots and registering for elections, as well 
as constitutional and other legal barriers meant to prevent the entrance of extreme 
ideologies into the government. Electoral barriers include the absence of proportional 
seat allocations—which favor the entry of smaller parties into the legislature—and 
restrictive electoral thresholds. Organizational challenges for parties include procuring 
campaign funding, party institutionalization and discipline, and sustainable access to 
grassroots movements.3   
 While each of these factors may penalize smaller parties in national competitions, 
many of these issues are somewhat less of a concern in European elections. As pertains 
                                                        
2 Four notable exceptions from these political groups are not included in the list of proposed fringe 
parties, as they have historically entered into governing coalitions in their home countries. These are 
the Austrian Freedom Party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Movement for France, 
and the Cypriot Progressive Party of Working People.  
3 For additional work on right-wing parties in Europe and their comparative successes and failures, 
see also Carter (2005), Ignazi (2006), and Williams (2006). 
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to electoral systems, EU regulations require that EP elections be held using some form 
of proportional representation—even in countries that use majoritarian systems to elect 
their national parliaments. As relates to other institutional barriers to entry, a recent 
German court ruling even went as far as to effectively end the use of electoral 
thresholds in European elections; campaign funding, at least for existing parties and 
party groups, is also heavily supported by the EU; ballot access requirements are also 
typically easier than in national elections. As a result, the EP is oftentimes more 
institutionally conducive to supporting smaller parties than are national parliaments.  
This second, more mechanical, definition of a fringe party is clearly related to the 
first in a number of ways. Returning to Table 1, we can see that many of the political 
parties that espouse fringe ideologies also earned relatively low shares of the vote in 
both recent EU and national elections. While many fringe parties outperformed their 
most recent national scores in the 2014 EP elections, it is also worth noting that the 
more proportional nature of EP elections means that parties that are blocked from 
national parliaments may still find seats in the EP, even with lower scores. This reality 
brings us to a discussion about how the nature of European elections may condition a 
different set of opportunity structures for fringe parties to recruit quality candidates in 
EP, rather than in national elections, and thereby treat the EP as their first order contest. 
Fringe party behavior in EP Elections 
 While institutional barriers to entry may prevent ideologically extreme, as well as 
other smaller fringe parties, from big gains in national elections, they have traditionally 
been less effective at keeping such parties out of EP elections. Kousser (2004) explores a 
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number of the explanations for the success of fringe parties in the EP. Among them, 
small parties tend to do better in EP, rather than in national elections, because they 
absorb both protest votes against major governing parties, as well as unfavorable 
retrospective economic evaluations of their home economic situations. Voters also feel 
less strategic when it comes to EP elections; accordingly, Kousser posits that votes for 
smaller parties in European elections can be seen as more ‘sincere’ than those votes 
cast in national competitions.   
The idea that EP voters will vote more so with their ‘hearts’ than their ‘minds’ 
also extends back to Reif and Schmitt's (1980) initial exploration of the second-order 
election hypothesis. However, it is also related to the decision that politicians face when 
deciding whether or not to run for election at the European level, as well as the decision 
that national parties face in deciding whether or not to select a candidate for a 
European or for a national contest (see, for example, work by Bhatti and Hansen, 2011, 
Hix and Marsh, 2007, and Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011). 
 A continued lack of interest in European elections on the part of both national 
voters and mainstream politicians also means that the connection between national 
political party organizations and the representatives selected by these political parties 
to serve at the EP level can be particularly tenuous. Jensen and Spoon (2010) explore 
the persistent lack of a connection between national parties and their MEPs. However, 
one unexpected finding from their work is that niche parties in the EP (such as the fringe 
parties described above) operate relatively independently from national party 
organizations, unless their party is in government domestically (see also work by 
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Thorlakson, 2005, on the organizational mismatch between national and European 
political parties).  
Such work suggests that political parties that cannot control decision-making at 
the national level or that are unable to win representation in national governments may 
instead use the EP as a sort of surrogate home base—in other words, their first-order 
political institution. On the other hand, the disconnect between central party decision-
makers and their representatives at the EU level is perhaps even more problematic in 
mainstream parties, as studies of major West European party families have suggested 
that EU membership has only led to an increasing centralization of decision-making 
taken by a handful of political party elites at the national level (i.e., Hertner 2013; 
Raunio 2002). This leads us to a discussion of why fringe parties may actually treat 
candidate selection for EP elections more attentively than their mainstream analogues. 
 
II. Why Fringe Parties Ought to Behave Differently in EP Elections  
 Thus far I have identified a particular subset of European political parties that 
operate outside of the mainstream and have thus traditionally faced substantial barriers 
to entry in the national political scene. However, these parties do perform 
comparatively better in continent-wide elections for the EP—which are traditionally less 
contested elections and are also of lesser interest to many voters. I have further 
suggested that many mainstream political parties have yet to adapt to the multi-level 
nature of elections in the EU effectively and continue to focus primarily on the national 
level, when it comes to selecting candidates for election and making policy decisions. If 
party organizations have become increasingly centralized in directing EU affairs, but 
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fringe parties perform better in EP—rather than in national—elections, might it be that 
fringe parties will actually treat EP elections as their ‘first order’ contests, when it comes 
time to select candidates and contest elections at both levels? 
Candidate Selection and Political Ambition 
 The variables of candidate selection practices and the professional ambitions of 
politicians are both highly connected and related to the question of fringe party 
behavior. At a theoretical level, Hazan and Rahat (2006), as well as Rahat (2009), offer 
the most concrete discussion of potential comparative candidate selection methods in 
Europe—which can either be driven by a limited clique of party leaders, the broader 
party membership, or even a public primary. Numerous other scholars have explored 
the dynamics of specific countries and party systems within this framework, exposing 
the many different candidate selection practices coexisting in EP elections (Chiva 2012; 
Gallagher et al. 1988; Gherghina and Chiru 2010; Lundell 2004; Poguntke 2007). 
   Less explored, however, is the extent to which candidate selection practices 
condition the individual ambitions of politicians. Particularly within the EP, the literature 
on the comparative professional ambitions of MEPs has remained somewhat chaotic, 
contradictory, and even inconclusive (see, for example, work by Meserve, Pemstein, and 
Bernhard 2009; Navarro 2009b; Scarrow 1997). While Daniel (2015) offers a theory for 
the career behavior of MEPs that examines the effect of legislative professionalization 
and party organization in varying European regime types, the mediating effect of 
political parties to control the professional fortunes of candidates at the European and 
national levels remains mostly unexplored.  
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A Theory of Fringe Party Behavior in EP Elections 
 In this paper, I propose that parties from outside of the political mainstream 
have a rational incentive to focus their energies on EP, as compared with national 
elections—where they have traditionally performed worse and where barriers to entry 
are higher. If fringe parties are indeed treating EP elections as their ‘first-order’ contests, 
then we might expect to see evidence of this in the displayed professional ambitions of 
fringe party politicians. Put in the language of Schlesinger (1966), I expect that fringe 
party politicians will demonstrate a greater degree of ‘static ambition’ than their 
mainstream colleagues—and thus seek reelection to the EP at higher rates. In other 
words, I expect to observe the following: 
H1. Politicians from fringe parties will be more likely to seek reelection the EP.  
 
Another way of thinking about this is that fringe parties have an incentive to select 
quality candidates for elections. In the broader literature on campaigns, candidate 
quality is often synonymous with candidate experience, which can be defined here as 
those candidates with prior experience in EP. In other words, if a fringe party is more 
interested in retaining and expanding upon its share of the EP than a mainstream party, 
then we ought to observe higher rates of incumbent MEPs from these parties 
attempting seeking reelection. This relationship can also be tested with a more general 
indicator of party size – and thus strength:   
H2. The greater the political party’s share of the vote in the most recent national 
election, the less likely a politician from that party will seek reelection the EP.  
 
 In other words, we should expect that larger parties in national elections may be 
less interested in EP contests, as they are predominantly preoccupied with the task of 
Rational Parties, Radical Voters? 12 
national governing. If this is the case, the reverse should also hold true. Smaller parties, 
who have a heightened opportunity for success at the EP level, will focus on winning 
these elections by nominating established MEPs to seek reelection at greater rates. One 
potential confounding factor, however, is that European elections are not always held in 
concert with national contests—which vary in accordance with domestic electoral 
systems and laws. Therefore, the decision to seek reelection to the EP should also be 
conditioned by the degree to which European elections correspond with the national 
electoral calendar. For this consideration, I expect the following: 
H3. Fringe parties will be more likely to nominate incumbent MEPs for reelection 
than mainstream ones, particularly when national contests have not been held 
for some time. 
 
 If MEPs from fringe parties are more interested in securing an electoral victory in 
the EP—either because of a personal interest in the institution or because they believe 
that they can more easily secure a seat there—then we should expect them to run for 
reelection to the EP in higher rates, particularly when EP elections are held at the 
‘midterm’ period or in an off year between national elections. While there are relatively 
few instances in which national elections are held during the exact same period as EP 
votes (although this was the case for the 2014 Belgian regional and federal elections), 
MEPs from smaller parties will be forced to prioritize their electoral ambitions in such a 
way that maximizes their possibility of winning in a world in which there are not only 
scarcer resources available to them than found in mainstream parties, but also fewer 
quality (experienced) candidates available to run for multiple levels of office. 
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  Work done by proponents of the second-order hypothesis also states that minor 
parties should perform better in EP elections than in national ones, because voters use 
EP elections to punish the major political parties. When EP election calendars are clearly 
distinct from national elections, MEPs from smaller parties have a rational incentive to 
seek reelection, because they are the most likely to benefit from voters frustrated with 
the current national government. Thus, the more time since a national election has 
been held, the greater the likelihood that fringe parties will benefit from retrospective 
evaluations made by voters of their national governments. Furthermore, if the national 
election has not been held in some time, it will also be more likely to be held soon. In 
this case, the EP election may actually serve as a sort of electoral barometer for the 
national contest. In either case, fringe parties should stand to benefit from EP elections 
that are held separately from national one and will thus seek reelection to the EP at 
higher rates.   
 
III. Data and Method: New Evidence from the MEP Careers Dataset 
To explore the relationship between fringe parties and the career behavior of 
MEPs, I use original individual-level data for all MEPs from the two most recently 
completed waves of the EP, 2004-20144. Sources for biographical data include Høyland, 
Sircar, and Hix's (2009) tool for extracting publicly available biographical data from the 
EP website, further data taken EU websites, as well as a variety of public records kept by 
the EP CARDOC archives in Luxembourg, national political archives in France and 
                                                        
4 A number of the control variables used in this study were initially collected for all MEPs, starting 
with the first European elections of 1979, and the findings of this paper are largely corroborated by 
this longer timespan. For more information on the full MEP careers dataset project, see Daniel (2013) 
and (2015). 
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Germany, and various other research library holdings. Official electoral lists for the 2014 
campaign were consulted using Burson-Marsteller’s “Europe Decides” project5. The unit 
of analysis is individual MEP-legislature, with a total of 1733 observations in the full 
sample used for this paper—representing observations for nearly all politicians serving 
in the 6th and 7th sessions of the EP. Missing data, although relatively minimal, is 
distributed randomly across MEP backgrounds—suggesting a lack of major concern that 
gaps in the data will bias the empirical results. 
Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable used throughout the empirical analysis is taken 
from an unordered indicator for an individual MEP’s career outcome following the 
conclusion of the EP term in question. For the purposes of this paper, the unordered 
variable is then recoded to dichotomously test for an MEP’s decision to seek reelection 
to the EP. Figure 1 provides some context to the future career paths of MEPs that do not 
seek reelection to the EP, following their mandate, 1979-2009. As it is not yet clear 
where MEPs from the 2009-2014 EP that did not seek reelection last month with 
inevitably move to next, the dependent variable used in the regression analysis 
considers only those MEPs that were selected by their parties to seek reelection. The 
selection of an incumbent can thus demonstrate the presence of a personal ambition to 
remain in the EP for the following term. As displayed in Figure 1, the plurality of 
outgoing MEPs typically seek reelection—although they do so to a lesser degree than is 
found in many national legislatures. 
                                                        
5 Publically available here: http://europedecides.eu  
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[ Figure 1 about here. ] 
Independent Variables  
Independent variables of interest and their related hypotheses are Fringe Party 
(H1), National Vote (H2), and Election Clock (H3). Summary statistics for all variables 
used in the displayed regression analyses are listed in the Appendix. Fringe Party is a 
dichotomous indicator for MEPs hailing from a national political party that appears on 
Table 1 and captures those parties with an ideologically extreme position. These parties 
are further separated into dichotomous indicators of Far Left, Eurosceptic, and Non-
Aligned MEPs in certain models. As posited by H1, I expect that parties from the 
ideological fringe will be more likely to seek reelection to the EP.  
 National Vote is a continuous variable that represents the vote share of the 
MEP’s national political party in the most recent national legislative elections, prior to 
the 2009 and 2014 elections. According to H2, a larger vote share should indicate the 
presence of a more mainstream party and thus a decreased likelihood of reelection 
seeking in the European elections. All observations are coded at the national party level, 
except for elections in which multiple national parties or party factions ran under the 
same list—in which case the total party list vote is counted.6 As indicated in some 
models, this variable is also recoded as a dichotomous indicator for parties receiving 
more than 10% of the vote in the most recent national election. Party vote share—as 
                                                        
6 One major exception to this rule is the Belgian political parties, in which the vote shares for parties 
from different language groups were added (i.e., the Dutch and French Liberals were coded as one 
party). This is done to avoid artificially biasing party vote-share downward and is acceptable, 
considering that Belgian national coalitions must contain equal members of Dutch and French 
ministers—thus both language parties are typically included in a governing coalition.  
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opposed to the share of the legislature—is used as a means of acknowledging the widely 
divergent electoral systems present across all EU member states.  
Election Clock is a count variable for the number of years elapsed since the most 
recent national legislative election and is counted from the EP election dates in 2009 
and 2014. According to H3, fringe party MEPs whose national legislatures have more 
recently held elections will stand to benefit less from EP elections than those whose 
elections are a few years out. Another way of thinking about this variable is to consider 
those countries where four years have already passed since legislative elections. In such 
cases, fringe MEPs will likely benefit from midterm evaluations of the governing party 
and assumptions about the outcome of the pending national elections. In either case, I 
expect that higher values of this variable will positively impact fringe parties MEPs to 
seek reelection. This is interacted with both measures for fringe parties, as described 
above. 
Control Variables 
EP Delegation Size measures the number of MEPs present in the country’s full 
national delegation. I expect that larger delegations (such as France or Germany) will 
have more diversity and fluidity in the career behavior of their members, as there are 
more seats available to them. New Member State is a dichotomous variable for the 12 
member states that acceded to the EU between 2004 and 2007, the 6th EP, and for 
Croatia, who acceded to the EU during the 7th EP. I expect that new members will be 
more enthusiastic about seeking reelection to the EP than their Western counterparts 
during their first term. 
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Local Elections is a trichotomous indicator of the presence of direct subnational 
elections in a given MEP’s home country and is taken from the dpi_state indicator 
initially developed by Beck et al. (2001; as mentioned by Teorell et al. 2011), which is a 
leading indicator for the functional presence of federalism in a country (Blume and Voigt 
2011; Voigt and Blume 2012). Countries with no direct subnational elections were coded 
with 0, countries with either a directly elected subnational executive or a legislature 
were coded with 1, and those with both a directly elected subnational legislature and an 
executive were coded with 2. Higher values of Local Elections indicate an important 
source of variation for functional federal organization. I expect that MEPs from more 
federal countries will be more likely to seek reelection (for more on this hypothesis, see 
Chapter 4 of Daniel 2015).  
 Rapporteurships is a count variable for the number of times that an individual 
MEP served as committee rapporteur during a given legislative period. Rapporteurs are 
a prestigious office within the EP, bestowed upon active MEPs who shepherd legislative 
proposals through the legislative process—assembling a majority opinion within the 
committee and serving as the point person for debates on a policy proposal prior to the 
taking of a plenary vote (Benedetto 2005; Daniel 2013; Kaeding 2004; Yoshinaka, 
Mcelroy, and Bowler 2010). I assume that MEPs who are assigned relatively high 
numbers of reports have succeeded in self-selecting their participation into this elite 
group of legislators. In other words, these politicians signal the ambition to remain in 
their current job. Similarly, MEPs who seek out Leadership positions—whether serving 
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as group coordinator, committee chair or committee vice chair—are also signaling a 
personal investment or desire to remain in the EP.  
A number of demographic differences are also considered, such as an MEP’s Age 
at the end of the given legislative period, Female MEPs, and MEPs who were 
Dropouts—having left office prior to the conclusion of their term—which were also 
accounted for.  Finally, MEPs that have already served at least one term are coded with 
the dichotomous indicator for Seniority.  
 
IV. Results and Discussion: Smaller Parties, Higher Stakes 
[ Table 2 about here.] 
 Table 2 displays principal regression coefficients from the logistic regression 
analysis, with standard errors reported below in parentheses. Robust standard errors 
were estimated in the models and are clustered by individual MEPs (that presumably 
could have appeared in both observed waves). As the comparative magnitude of logistic 
coefficient values are not directly interpretable, marginal effects plots are described 
below, in order to discuss the substantive significance of statistically significant 
coefficients. 
 Models 1 and 4 estimate the effects of national party size and ideological 
extremeness on the selection of outgoing MEPs to seek reelection, without interacting 
these variables with the national electoral clock. As a baseline, these models provide 
only modest support for H1 and H2, although Model 1 does indicate that non-aligned 
MEPs (that typically come from far-right parties, such as the French National Front or 
Austria Freedom Party) do seem to seek reelection more readily than other MEPs, all 
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else held equal. Control variables, displayed on the right-hand portion of the table, 
consistently provide evidence for a number of the mitigating factors that might be 
expected to influence an MEP’s reselection, as discussed above. 
 Once the interaction posited by H3 is included in the models, however, 
additional support for each of the hypotheses begins to emerge. In Model 2, the 
electoral clock is shown to have a positive and significant effect on the decision of MEPs 
to seek reelection, specifically when they come from parties that received 0% of the 
national election results (in other words, their parties did not even contest the national 
elections). The substantive significance of this interaction is plotted using predicted 
probabilities for real existing values in the data and is displayed in Figure 2. 
[ Figure 2 about here. ] 
 Figure 2 displays the conditional probability that an MEP will stand for reelection, 
given his or her party’s national vote share in the most recent national election and the 
time elapsed since that election was held. While the graph clearly displays that 
mainstream parties (that received a larger share of the national vote) do not treat EP 
elections significantly differently based upon the electoral clock (displayed here as a 
total convergence of the lines representing the electoral clock), there do appear to be 
significant differences for the smaller parties, based upon the national electoral 
calendar. More specifically, an MEP from a small party that did not stand in the national 
election (and thus received 0% of the vote) is nearly 25% more likely to be selected to 
stand for reelection, when that national election was held four years ago – rather than 
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in the same year – with varying degrees of differentiation in between. This general 
pattern is mitigated as the national vote share of the party increases.  
[ Figure 3 about here. ] 
 Presented in starker terms, Figure 3 provides a similar graph based upon Model 
3, which dichotomizes political parties into ‘large’ and ‘small,’ depending upon whether 
they received more or less than 10% of the national vote. Although the selection of the 
10% threshold is somewhat arbitrary (it was selected because it is twice the German 
threshold for entry into the Bundestag, which is often considered to be the watermark 
for what can be considered ‘too small’ to enter into a parliament), party size very much 
seems to matter when it comes to selecting MEPs—particular as EP elections become 
increasingly removed from national ones. As demonstrated by the figure, MEPs hailing 
from smaller parties have nearly a 70% likelihood of seeking reelection to the EP, when 
their home country has not held an election in four years – a figure that is nearly 15% 
higher than the relative likelihood than an MEP from a large party will stand for 
reelection.  
An analysis of the control variables used in Model 3 tells a similarly interesting 
story about what types of MEPs stand for reelection. Marginal effects reveal that MEPs 
from countries with both a subnational elected executive and legislature are about 9.4% 
more likely to seek reelection to the EP, than those from countries with only nationally 
elected legislatures and executive positions. The result that MEPs from federal countries 
are more likely to seek reelection to the EP than those from unitary ones is also 
germane to my theory of party organization, as it suggests that political parties in 
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federal countries are less centralized in their candidate selection and nomination 
practices—which may favor the independent agency of those politicians wishing to 
specialize at a particular level of government across multiple terms.  
MEPs that are more active as rapporteurs in the legislature are shown to be 
more likely to seek reelection (an effect of about 1.1% for each additional 
rapporteurship completed, up to a maximum of 55 completed rapporteurships in a 
given term)—an indicator that MEPs who choose to participate and specialize in the 
legislative process are perhaps more committed to building a long-term career in the EP, 
regardless of their party background. Also interesting is that MEPs from countries that 
were new to the EP in that term, due to a recent enlargement, were more than 20% 
more likely to seek reelection for a further term, as compared with veteran EU member 
states—suggesting that new members behave somewhat differently than longstanding 
ones in their treatment of the EP. 
Looking more at the effect of individual demographics on the decision to seek 
reelection, MEP age is shown to have a negative effect on reelection seeking, though 
the effect is not particularly large (0.8% per year). Senior MEPs were about 6% less likely 
to seek reelection for yet another term. MEPs from larger delegations were significantly 
more likely to seek reelection, although the substantive importance of this finding is 
quite small (less than 0.1% more likely for each additional member of the delegation). In 
short, most of the control variables perform in ways that are both substantively and 
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statistically significant across all models, even when fringe parties and national elections 
are taken into consideration.7  
 Although the analysis from the current section provides useful quantitative 
evidence that fringe parties may treat EP elections as more important than their 
mainstream competitors, particularly when they stand to gain from a midterm or a 
retrospective voting effect in an electoral off year, it is also useful to corroborate the 
found statistical effects with specific examples from the outgoing 7th session of the EP. 
Table 3 provides evidence that the fringe parties discussed are often led by politicians 
whose main elected office is the EP, itself, and provides further evidence that fringe 
parties consider the EP as their first order electoral home. 
[ Table 3 about here. ] 
 Table 3 details national party leaders that also sit in the European Parliament. It 
should be immediately evident from the table that most of the party leaders who have 
chosen to serve as MEPs (and thus can not be national MPs) also come from the fringe 
parties listed in Table 1. In fact, out of the 40 national parties from the 7th session of the 
EP that were identified as ‘fringe’ political movements in this analysis, a full 13 of them 
are led by sitting MEPs at the time of the 2014 elections. Of the remaining hundreds of 
mainstream political parties represented in the EP, on the other hand, only seven 
parties were being led by sitting MEPs, as of May 2014 – and many of these are smaller 
parties that are disadvantaged in national elections, themselves. In other words, not 
only are smaller and fringe elements more likely to seek reelection to the EP when they 
                                                        
7 Additional control variables that are not displayed in Table 2 or discusses in the analysis are listed 
in the back matter, following Table 2.  
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believe that they can stand to gain more from EP than from national elections, but their 
party organizations are also led in many cases by sitting MEPs, themselves. 
 
V. Conclusions and Further Research 
This paper has explored differences in the treatment of EP elections by fringe 
political parties. Using individual-level evidence for the careers of MEPs in the two most 
recently completed waves of parliament, 2004-2014, I am able to offer some support for 
the hypothesis that fringe parties—whether defined simply as small parties or as 
ideologically extremist movements—are more likely to treat EP elections as important, 
‘first-order’ elections and that they do so especially when the national electoral calendar 
is likely to favor them in EP elections. In a parliament that is notorious for high degrees 
of membership turnover and low levels of popular voter interest, this is an interesting 
finding and suggests that while many smaller parties espouse fringe and even radical 
ideologies, they also behave in highly rational ways when it comes to recruiting quality 
and experienced candidates for elections. 
 Naturally, the data presented in this paper offer only a small snapshot of the full 
dynamics of fringe party behavior in both national and EU elections. Beyond expanding 
the coding for the national vote share and national calendar variables back to 1979, in 
order to test for a more dynamic and robust effect for these hypotheses, future work 
can also consider how the makeup of fringe party organizations differs from mainstream 
parties—beyond simply the party leadership discussion demonstrated in Table 3. More 
specifically, with the recent EP elections now complete and a number of the parties 
explored by this paper having made substantial gains in Brussels and Strasbourg, it will 
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be interesting to see just how much of these fringe party leadership organizations have 
found themselves with a full-time job in the EP until at least 2019. 
Although the specific MEPs elected to the 8th EP will not be officially seated in 
the parliament until July 2014, plenty of anecdotal and journalistic evidence already 
suggests that fringe elements, such as the National Front or UKIP, will play a major role 
in the upcoming session of the EP—with other notable fringe leaders, such as Geert 
Wilders, perhaps even choosing to leave national politics for a seat in the European 
legislature. While mainstream parties in France and United Kingdom have seen these 
gains as increased evidence that they have a dire need to reorganize their domestic 
political organizations, fringe parties have clearly benefitted from the spoils of the 
second-order election hypothesis once again – even if for these parties, a seat in the EP 
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Tables 
Table 1. EP Fringe Parties and their Electoral Successes, 2009-2014 
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Table 2. The Effect of Party Size and the Decision to Seek Reelection to the EP, 2009-14 
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Notes for Table 2. 
 
 
Table 3. The Presence of Party Leaders in the EP 
Country National Party Name Party Leader in EP 
Fringe  (13 of 40 national parties considered) 
Bulgaria National-Democratic Party Dimitar Stoyanov 
Finland Perussuomalaiset Timo Soini 
France Mouvement pour la France Philippe de Villiers 
France Front de Gauche Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
France Front National Marine Le Pen 
Ireland Socialist Party Committee Led 
Italy Lega Nord Matteo Salvini 
Lithuania Partija Tvarka Rolandas Paksas 
Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid Geert Wilders (2014-) 
Poland Solidarna Polska Zbigniew Ziobro 
Romania Partidul România Mare Corneliu Vadim Tudor 
UK An Independence from Europe Mike Nattrass 
UK UK Indepdence Party Nigel Farage 
UK British National Partie Nick Griffin 
Mainstream 
  Bulgaria Coalition for Bulgaria Sergei Stanishev 
France Europe Ecologie - Les Verts Eva Joly 
France Mouvement Democrate Fraçois Bayrou 
France Mouvement pour la France Philippe de Villiers 
Greece Ecologists Greens Committee Led 
Greece Drassi (Liberals) Theodoros Skylakakis 
Ireland Sinn Fein Committee Led 




Rational Parties, Radical Voters? 28 
Figures 






































Rational Parties, Radical Voters? 31 
Appendix 
Appendix A. Summary Statistics for Table 2 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Seek Reelection 1733 0.577 0.494 0 1 
National Vote 1733 25.269 15.752 0 60.07 
National Vote (Dichotomous) 1733 0.252 0.434 0 1 
Fringe Party 1733 0.113 0.316 0 1 
Far Left 1733 0.052 0.222 0 1 
Eurosceptic 1731 0.036 0.187 0 1 
Non-Aligned 1731 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Election Clock 1733 2.147 1.192 0 4 
Seniority 1733 0.385 0.487 0 1 
Local Elections 1733 1.384 0.721 0 2 
Age at End of Mandate 1733 55.299 10.447 26 86 
EP Delegation Size 1733 48.969 29.898 5 99 
New Member State 1733 0.143 0.350 0 1 
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